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Abstract—This paper reports the implementation of a low-
area low-power 128-bit PUF-based key generation module which
exploits a novel Two-Stage IDentification (TSID) cell showing a
higher noise immunity then a standard SRAM cell. In addition,
the pre-selection technique introduced in [1] is applied. This
results in a stable PUF response in spite of process and envi-
ronmental variations thus requiring a low cost error correction
algorithm in order to generate a reliable key. The adopted PUF
cell array includes 1056 cells and shows a power consumption
per bit of 4.2µW at 100MHz with an area per bit of 2.4µm2. In
order to evaluate reliability and unpredictability of the generated
key, extensive tests have been performed both on the raw PUF
data and on the final key. The raw PUF data after pre-selection
show a worst case intra-chip Hamming distance below 0.7%.
After a total of more than 5× 109 key reconstructions, no single
fail has been detected.
I. INTRODUCTION
Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) gained attention as
a primitive function for identification, especially if no other
secured key storage alternative is available.
As a consequence, a large number of different circuital
techniques to implement a PUF in a standard silicon process
has been investigated. Three basic classes can be distinguished:
1) Delay-based PUFs: the time difference due to local pro-
cess variations between two nominally identical paths is
measured and quantized. Ring oscillator PUFs, Arbiter-
based PUFs and Glitch PUFs belong to this class [2],
[3].
2) Memory-cell based PUFs: the power-up behavior of
memory cells without power on reset (latches or flip-
flops) is exploited. Local mismatches in the cell transis-
tors can cause an unpredictable state when the device is
powered-up. This category includes SRAM PUFs, Latch
PUFs, D Flip-Flop PUFs and Buskeeper PUFs [4], [5],
[6].
3) Hybrid PUFs: the two techniques above are combined
together in order to improve the randomness of the
response and/or the security against attacks [7].
In spite of the wide range of contributions in this field, a
complete characterization (under process and environmental
variations) of the proposed ideas is not always available. Often
too few devices are tested or temperature variations are not
taken into account. A first attempt to systematically compare
ASIC implementations of the most common PUF types has
been reported in [8]: the authors measured about 100 parts
and found out bit error rates (BER) between 6 and 15%
depending on the PUF type, coming to the conclusion that
SRAM PUFs, with an error rate in the order of 7%, show the
best performances in terms of reliability and unpredictability
of the output. A characterization of ring oscillator PUFs has
been reported in [9].
In this work, we focused on the usage of PUFs as key
generators and the target was the design of a reliable small
footprint PUF module, which can be used if no NVM module
is available.
Since area and power consumption are main constraints
in a chip-card controller, the focus was on the design of a
custom PUF cell which is inherently more reliable than a
standard latch or SRAM cell, thus reducing the complexity
of the error correction scheme. The proposed two stages
identification (TSID) cell operates in two phases behaving
as a differential amplifier during a first phase, in order to
amplify the local mismatch of two minimum area transistors,
and as a latch as soon as a trigger signal is activated. Details
about the operating principle and a comparison with a standard
latch are reported in Section II. In addition, in order to sort
out the few cells that, due to the little mismatch, are more
sensitive to noise, temperature and parameter variations, the
pre-selection technique introduced in [1] has been adopted.
Mask data are generated before the error correction signature
during the enrollment and stored in the NVM. During the key
reconstruction, the raw data from the PUF cell array (PCA) are
first compacted by applying the mask data and then the error
correction is performed. The architecture of the proposed key
generator is shown in Figure 1: the PCA consists of 1056 TSID
cells organized in 22 blocks of 48 cells each. The 48 cells in
a block share the same sense amplifier (SA), thus strongly
reducing the area of the array. The PCA implementation
including the pre-selection is discussed in Section III. The
ECC is a standard block code which generates a 128-bit key
from the raw data after the masking.
In order to prove reliability and unpredictability of the
generated key, extensive tests have been performed on the raw
data by measuring, over temperature, about 100 devices from
different lots (including split lots). In a first phase, the masking
functionality has been tested, by varying the amount of pre-
selection up the the maximum value which still leaves enough
cells for the ECC (up to 7 bits in each 22 bit block can be
discarded). Afterward, instability (defined as the cumulative
number of bits which are not stable over the performed read-
outs), inter- and intra-chip Hamming distance (HD), bias, and
spatial correlations have been measured, finding out that, over
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Figure 1. The proposed PUF-based key generator
the temperature range −40/+110°C, a worst case instability
of about 11% and 2% has to be expected for the proposed
PUF before and after pre-selection respectively. The Intra-
chip HD (i.e. BER) is below 5% without pre-selection and
drops down to maximum 0.7% (at −40°C), if pre-selection is
applied. Finally, the stability of the PUF key has been tested by
performing the enrollment at 25°C and 106 key reconstructions
at −40°C and +110°C respectively. After testing 3 wafers
from different process corners, for a total of about 2000
devices, no single key reconstruction fail has been detected.
A summary of the obtained experimental results is reported in
Section IV.
II. THE TSID CELL
The ideal cell in a memory-cell based PUF should generate
a stable binary output, dependent on local process variations
but immune to electronic noise, disturbances (e.g. from a noisy
power supply as in a chip-card controller), global process vari-
ations, temperature and aging. Long before the PUF became
a topic in the cryptographic community, the problem of gen-
erating an ID from local process variations in a chip has been
already addressed. In [10], an identification device is patented
which is based on an array of identification cells and a circuit
for measuring the analog output of each cell and generating
a digital data. Each cell includes two equally sized MOS
transistors which are biased with the same gate-source voltage.
Due to local process variations, the transistor pair shows
different threshold voltages and, therefore, the corresponding
drain currents are different. The current difference is converted
into a voltage difference, amplified and compared using a
precise comparator (auto-zeroing comparator) to generate a
string of bits. It is unlikely that such a device could be used
in a security application (the large analog circuitry could be
rather easily probed), but the basic idea was already there:
using the unique local process variations to generate on the
fly a chip-individual digital information.
More recently, in [6], the authors proposed an identification
device based on an array of latches (Figure 2). Initially, both
sides of the latch are pulled down (reset is high). As the
reset is released, each latch evaluates to a state determined by
the switching threshold mismatch of the two inverters in the
latch. The main advantage with respect to [10] is the simple
(low area) implementation: due to the positive feedback, the
same circuit generates the process dependent offset, amplifies
it and performs the one bit digitization. However, this brings
as drawback a higher sensitivity to electronic noise: when
the reset is released, the output nodes (out_p, out_n) are
charged up together. As soon as they are close to the inverter
thresholds, the positive feedback forces the outputs to diverge:
which output goes in which direction depending on which
PMOS is stronger and which NMOS has the lowest threshold.
Clearly, around the decision point, the circuit is sensitive to
noise: if a noise event (or disturbance) occurs right before the
decision instant, the positive feedback can force the outputs in
the wrong direction. Once the outputs take one direction, they
saturate to VDD/VSS. Of course, as smaller is the mismatch,
as higher is the sensitivity to noise and disturbances. The
authors report that 5.5% of the bits in a 128-bit identification
device are not stable. However, the data could be optimistic
since the evaluation has been done on 19 dies only and on a
reduced temperature range (0− 80°C).
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Figure 2. Latch-based ID cell
To show how the noise can lead to a wrong decision, a
transient noise Spice simulation of the cell has been performed
by forcing an offset current ∆I = 50nA which simulates
a mismatch between the PMOS transistors. The differential
output V out is plotted in Figure 3 over 100 runs (simulating
100 evaluations of the same cell with mismatch ∆I): 9% of
the simulated start-ups results in a wrong response.
The TSID cell addresses the noise issue by combining the
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Figure 3. Latch-based ID cell: noise stability
positive feedback with the amplification approach in [10]. A
principle scheme is shown in Figure 4: two nominally equal
bias currents Ibiasand Ibias±∆I are forced on a positive feed-
back decision circuit (load) thus generating, when trigger_n is
low, a differential voltage on out_p, out_n proportional to the
offset ∆I and the differential impedance seen looking into the
load (very high,  1MΩ). When the trigger signal is raised
(trigger_n = 0), the two switches under the diode connected
NMOS’s are open and the positive feedback pushes the outputs
to VDD and VSS respectively. With respect to the cell in
Figure 2, in this case there is a phase during which the offset is
amplified and only when the trigger is activated, the decision
is taken on which direction the outputs saturate. Therefore,
offset amplification and decision/digitization are two separate
phases. During the first phase the circuit is not sensitive to
noise. In the second one, the amplified offset has reached its
maximum value thus increasing the signal/noise ratio.
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Figure 4. TSID cell: operating principle
The same transient noise simulation as in Figure 3 has been
repeated for the TSID cell (with ∆I = 50nA) and in this
case none of the 100 runs leads to a wrong decision: after the
offset amplification, the electronic noise amplitude is much
too small to affect the decision. The distribution of the output
voltage Vout short before the cell is triggered, simulated over
103 Monte Carlo runs at 25°C, is shown in Figure 5 (upper
plot): it is interesting noting how the amplification reshapes
the mismatch distribution generating a hole around the zero,
thus decreasing the number of cells which can be affected
by the noise. The same simulation has been performed at
−40 and +120°C and the distribution of the cells whose
response is unstable over temperature (i.e. (Vout @−40°C)
<> (Vout@120°C)) is shown in the lower plot: 3.4% of the
cells results to be unstable and, as expected, the unstable
cells are the ones with the smaller amplified mismatch. As
reported in [1], the temperature instability is caused by the
mismatch in the temperature coefficient of the MOS threshold
voltage Vth: two transistors which show a Vth mismatch in
one direction at low temperature can have a mismatch in the
opposite direction at high temperature. Of course, cells with a
little mismatch at the reference temperature are more affected
by the temperature instability and the solution proposed in [1]
consists of sorting out these cells (pre-selection). The authors
adopted this technique in this work since, as shown in the
followings, it can be applied to the TSID cell with a negligible
area overhead and it results to be very effective.
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Figure 5. TSID: temperature stability
III. PCA IMPLEMENTATION
A top level description of each block in the PCA is given in
Figure 6. The 48 cells in a block share the same sense amplifier
and an address decoder allows to select the cell that must be
evaluated. A bias generation block provides the biasing signals
for the bit cells. The cells are organized in 4 columns of 12
cells each. In contrast with the principle scheme in Figure 4,
the TSID cell implementation is reversed: a minimum area
NMOS differential pair and two NMOS switches to select
one cell inside a row are placed in each bit cell while the
load circuit is shared and implemented with PMOS’s which
are large enough to have a mismatch (i.e. a sensing offset)
negligible with respect of the average mismatch of the bit
cells. As a result, the response depends almost uniquely on the
selected bit cell. In addition, the share sense amplifier provides
also some capacitive load that reduces the noise on the bit cell
outputs (sens_p, sens_n) and therefore increases the response
stability.
Since the bit cell includes just one type of MOS, the whole
cell array is built in a single silicon bulk area thus avoiding the
large area loss that follows when two different kinds of bulks
must be alternated on the surface. A very compact layout for
the cell array can be used and, as a result, the bit cell is much
smaller than a typical SRAM cell (Table I).
By choosing NMOS transistors as mismatch devices, we
can get rid of the negative-bias temperature instability (NBTI)
which affects PMOS devices and is the main responsible for
aging degradation in a SRAM PUF by causing an increase in
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Figure 6. PCA block implementation
the threshold voltage over the time. In addition, the bit cells
are powered only when they are addressed thus decreasing
power consumption and other aging effects.
The output latch allows to store the previous evaluated
response while the next one is evaluated. The sense amplifier
is also provided with a precharge (precharge_n) and a trigger
(trig) input. The signal precharge_n performs a fast reset of
the sensing input before starting the next response evaluation.
The signal trig changes the behavior of the sense amplifier
from high impedance (sensing mode) to negative impedance
(latching mode). Since the output is latched by the sense
amplifier itself, the input offset of the following latch cannot
have any effect on the PUF response. The cell evaluation lasts
in total ten clock cycles at 100MHz including one cycle for
the precharge, eight cycles for the amplification phase (80ns)
and a last one to latch the data.
The bit cell structure is shown in 7, where the bias genera-
tion is also sketched. The cells are all connected in parallel to
the same current source and to the same bias signals ref_p and
ref_n. Two levels of switches allow the selection of the cell.
The row switches are inside the cell, while the column ones are
shared by the whole column. The pre-selection functionality
is implemented in the bias generator by forcing a voltage
difference between ref_p and ref_n. In normal operation, no
current flows through Rp and Rn and, therefore, ref_n = ref_p
and each cell delivers an output that depends only on its
internal mismatch. When some current is injected in Rp or
Rn, a certain offset is forced on the inputs of the bit cell. As
a result, the cells whose internal mismatch is not large enough
can change their response depending whether or not the forced
offset has the opposite direction with respect to the internal
mismatch. Hence, by forcing an offset in both direction, it is
possible to pinpoint the weak bit cells as the ones that change
their response depending on the sign of the pre-selection offset.
Of course, the offset level can be adjusted in order to perform
a more or less selective pre-selection.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
The 1056-bit PCA full-custom macro has an area of about
3250µm2. The rest of the module has been synthesized. A
1.35V power supply and a 100MHz clock are available for
the PUF. The average current consumption during the readout
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Figure 7. TSID cell with pre-selection
of a 22-bit PUF word is about 47µA at 100MHz, where 25µA
is the current consumption of the bias circuitry. This results
in an energy dissipation of 42fJ/bit.
Performance Value Unit
Total area 3250 µm2
Bit-cell area 2.4 µm2
Cell count 1056
Energy/bit 42 fJ/bit
Power/bit@100MHz 4.2 µW
Table I
ANALOG CHARACTERISTICS
A first set of measurements has been performed to evaluate
functionality and performance of the pre-selection circuit. In
Table II, the average (over 102 readouts) of the first 10 bits
in a PCA with different values of pre-selection are reported.
Most of the bits are stable (average 0 or 1) and they can be
toggled only if a strong pre-selection is applied. The 7-th bit
results to be unstable and it can be easily sort out by applying
even the smallest pre-selection amplitude (bit @pre-selection
= -1 6= bit@pre-selection = +1).
The total number of unstable bits has been evaluated by
reading the PUF raw data 103 times at −40, 25 and 110°C
over 96 dies extracted from 3 wafers from different process
corners. The obtained results are shown in Figure 8 before
and after pre-selection is applied. The percentage of masked
bits is also shown. For the pre-selection, the largest value
which still leaves enough bits (up to 7 bits in a 22-bit word
can be masked) is used. In addition, the readout of the PUF
is repeated 16 (for both pre-selection directions) during the
mask generation accumulating the results. Of course, the mask
generation is performed only once at 25°C. After pre-selection,
the instability is below 2% and a maximum of about 25%
of the cells are masked. It is worth noting that, since the
pre-selection strength is chip-individual adjusted in discrete
steps to the maximum which still allows a key generation,
two clusters are visible in the lower plot: most of the dies are
adjusted for the smallest pre-selection (0 - 15% masked bits),
for the others the next step is used (20-25% masked bits).
Process dependencies are not observable.
In Figure 9, the effect of temperature variations on the intra-
chip HD without masking is shown: one device has been read
5Pre-selection steps
Bit # -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7
1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
6 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.14 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.99 1 1 1 1 1
9 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Table II
BASIC PRE-SELECTION TEST
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Figure 8. Instability and number of masked bits
out 103 times at 3 temperatures, taking one PUF response at
25°C as reference. As expected, the temperature contribution
is predominant with respect to the noise.
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The intra-chip HD evaluated over the complete set of tested
modules at 3 temperatures after pre-selection is shown in
Figure 10: a worst case value of 0.7% at −40°C has been
obtained. Such a low error rate can be easily handled with a
low cost error correction code.
In order to verify the unpredictability of the generated
key, inter-chip HD, bias and the correlation between two
neighboring bits have been evaluated. The inter-chip HD has
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Figure 10. Intra-chip HD after pre-selection
been measured over 1080 modules and its average value
HDINTER = 49.986% is almost ideal (Figure 11). The
average of the PUF raw data before pre-selection (1056 bits)
calculated over 1080 modules is 49.995% showing that the
data have no relevant bias (Figure 12). The same average per-
formed on the bit position (Figure 13), gives almost the same
distribution thus excluding dependencies with the position of
a bit in the array (Figure 13).
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V. CONCLUSIONS
A 128-bit PUF-based key generator which exploits an
improved identification cell and the masking of weak bits is
described. The module is extremely compact, requiring only
1056 PUF cells to generate a reliable and unpredictable key.
The total PUF cell array needs 3250µm2 and shows an energy
consumption per bit of 42fJ/bit. The bit cell area (2.4µm2)
results to be even smaller than that of a standard SRAM cell.
It is also worth noting that in a SRAM which is not designed
to be used as PUF, the cell layout is not necessary perfectly
symmetric. This means that the bits can be biased and thus,
in order to extract enough entropy, a larger number of cells is
necessary than in the proposed generator.
Extensive tests have been performed on the PUF raw data
on about 100 dies from different wafers covering process
variations, over the temperature range −40 to 110°C. A
maximum intra-chip HD of 0.7% have been measured. An
analysis of the bias and correlation did not highlight any
relevant statistical defect. The stability of the generated key
has been tested by performing the enrollment at 25°C and 106
key reconstructions at −40°C and +110°C. After testing about
2000 devices from different wafers, for a total of more than
5× 109 key reconstructions, no single fail has been detected.
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